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ACDA Paper

DENUCLEARIZED ZONES
AS RELATED TO THE CUBAN SITUATIONTHE PROBLEM

To consider questions related to the establishment of denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa as a means of offering an additional option in the Cuban situation, and to examine possible implications of support of denuclearized zones in those regions for U.S. interests in other geographic areas.

BACKGROUND

In considering possible options in the Cuban situation, the question arises as to whether the United States might support the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Latin America. Since the Brazilians have already proposed and have discussed with a number of other members of the U.N. the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Africa as well as Latin America, it is necessary to consider both regions as representing immediate possibilities. Support of denuclearized zones in these regions might lead to proposals by other countries to establish such zones in additional geographic areas, and the implications of such additional denuclearization.

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zones for United States interests should be examined insofar as they have a bearing on the position which the United States should take with respect to denuclearized zones in Africa and Latin America.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the United States support the establishment in Latin America and Africa of denuclearized zones based on the concepts set forth in the discussion section below.

DISCUSSION

1. Denuclearized Zones in Latin America and Africa.

a. General considerations.

(1) Participation. The United States should encourage the establishment of denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa where it is the consensus of the countries in these regions that such a zone should be established. The United States should be prepared to accept the establishment of denuclearized zones covering sub-regions of Latin America or Africa on the basis of such a consensus but should ensure that Cuba be included in any such zone in Latin America. The establishment of such a zone in Latin America would not only afford an acceptable basis, at least to the United States, for settling the present Cuban problem but would go a long way toward preventing similar problems from arising in that area in the future.

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(2) Obligations of participating states. States participating in demuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa ^{would} be subject to the following obligations:

(a) Not to manufacture nuclear weapons or missiles or aircraft for carrying nuclear weapons and not to construct launching pads for ^{such} missiles; not to seek or accept assistance from any other state for such purposes; and not to acquire such weapons, vehicles, and launching pads in any other manner;

(b) Not to permit the storage, stationing, or testing of such weapons or vehicles in the territory under their jurisdiction and control;

(c) To accomplish the disposal or withdrawal of such weapons and vehicles and the dismantling of such launching pads as may presently be in the territory under their jurisdiction and control;

(d) To accept such verification arrangements, as might be suitable to the region involved, including, where appropriate, the possibility of receiving observers designated

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by the U.N. or other observers designated on a reciprocal basis according to arrangements within the region; and

(c) To report to an appropriate organ of the U.N. on progress in implementing denuclearization of the region involved.

(3) Obligations of nuclear states. The United States should undertake to cooperate with and respect arrangements along the foregoing lines, and other states possessing nuclear weapons/ ^{and} missiles or aircraft for carrying nuclear weapons should accept a similar undertaking.

(4) Unacceptable limitations. The United States should discourage the imposition of limitations on the temporary transport or passage of nuclear weapons, ^{or of ships,} missiles, or aircraft ^{for} carrying nuclear weapons through the territory or jurisdiction of states participating in denuclearized zones. In view of the need for opposing such limitations, the United States should take the position that any action by the U.N. endorsing establishment of such zones should be in general terms and that detailed statements of obligations should be

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negotiated by the states concerned. Alternatively, the United States should be prepared to accept a statement of obligations along the foregoing lines.

b. Special problems in Latin America.

(1) Special U.S. Interests. The United States should be prepared to accept the denuclearization of all of Latin America south of the United States border with the exception of territory under the jurisdiction and control of the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The United States would, however, undertake to cooperate with and respect the denuclearization of the remainder of Latin America. If it should be necessary for the United States to justify the foregoing exception, consideration might be given to the possibility that the OAS might request the United States to exclude the areas involved in order to maintain satisfactory arrangements for defense of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Possible Arguments on Cuba. In the discussion of a denuclearized zone covering Latin America, the United States would have to be prepared to meet a Cuban argument that the missiles and strategic aircraft on its territory are required to deter a possible United States invasion. The Cubans, or the Soviets, might suggest that any arrangement for a nuclear

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free zone should include a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba. This argument might be countered by a suggestion that Cuba should have a guarantee/neutrality like that of Austria. The suggestion might also be made by/any others that demuclearized zone in Latin America would have to involve demuclearization of Guantanamo Bay.

c. Special Problems in Africa.

(1) Overall U.S. Interests. It should be possible and would be desirable to achieve a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The United States should support such a zone, not only on its own merits, but also as a means of capitalizing on the interest which the African countries have already expressed in such a measure and focussing this interest on the problem of Latin America. In any case, since Brazil has already coupled the two zones in its own proposals, it would be exceedingly difficult for the United States to support a zone in Latin America but not Africa.

(2) Special U.S. Interests. The establishment of an African demuclearized zone [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] As is the case in Latin America, the United States would have to oppose any limitation on transit rights.

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(3) French interests. The French have committed themselves to stopping nuclear tests in Africa at some future time. Denuclearization of Africa might force this issue upon the French at an earlier date than they had anticipated. However, cessation of nuclear testing would be an essential element of the establishment of a denuclearized zone.

(4) Non-participation of U.A.R. In view of Arab-Israeli relationships, the U.A.R. should probably not be considered as part of an African denuclearized zone. In that event, pressure for a Middle East zone including the U.A.R., Israel, and neighboring states might materialize.

(5) Non-participation of other African countries. If a number of African states, possibly including South Africa, did not participate, the United States might wish to consider taking the position that, insofar as its own actions were concerned, it would regard the entire African continent as denuclearized unless activities in non-participating states indicated that this was not the case.

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2. Demuclearization of other geographic areas.

a. General considerations. At the present time, all that is under active consideration in the U.N. are proposals for demuclearized zones for Latin America and Africa. Since a sympathetic attitude to these proposals on the part of the United States will encourage consideration of demuclearized zones in other regions, it is necessary to consider the implications of these zones. As indicated below, the establishment of these zones would raise serious problems for the United States, but they do not change the conclusion that a sympathetic attitude on the part of the United States towards demuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa is in the best interests of the United States.

b. Middle East

(1) Turkish participation. If a demuclearized zone were proposed for the entire Middle East, the question of Turkish participation would be raised. Two alternatives arise:

(a) Since Turkey is a member of NATO, it might be considered as an integral part of the European problem rather than of a Middle East demuclearized zone.

(b) An alternative approach would be to include Turkey in the Middle East zone. If it should become necessary to consider the possible withdrawal of offensive

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nuclear weapons from Turkey in order to achieve a settlement of the Cuban situation, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] inclusion of Turkey in a Middle East de-nuclearized zone might be a more preferable way of introducing an element of flexibility than engaging in an unvarnished trade-off between Turkey and Cuba. However, although such a move would not seriously affect the over-all Western deterrent, it would clearly present major political difficulties and would, at the least, necessitate substantial steps reaffirming the United States commitment to the defense of Turkey and to NATO as a whole.

(2) Other participants. Apart from the question of Turkey, a zone covering the entire Middle East might be generally considered to include all states in the region extending from the U.A.R. to Afghanistan, but not including Pakistan. Although Iran is a member of CENTO and would be affected by such a zone, the fact that Iran has already

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not
committed itself/ to receive missile bases on its territory
appears to alleviate possible repercussions for CENTO.

(3) U.A.R.-Israel. In view of the recent acquisition of rockets by Israel and the U.A.R., a denuclearized zone would have a real effect in stabilizing this area. At some time, the United States might wish to consider at least a limited denuclearized zone in the Middle East with this in view.

c. Asia and the Western Pacific.

(1) Participation of Communist China. An Asian-Western Pacific zone would have to include Communist China as well as Pakistan, India, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and other nearby countries. If Chinese Communist participation in such a zone could be obtained on terms acceptable to the United States, the establishment of such a zone would appear advantageous. However, in this zone more than in the others considered above, the risk of cheating would be a serious problem. From the point of view of the United States, the possibility that Communist China might secretly continue a

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a nuclear program would be a major consideration, but it seems unlikely that Communist China could develop a capability threatening to the United States without detection by this country. If such cheating were detected, the United States could probably "nuclearize" the areas considerably faster than the Chinese could develop an effective capability.

(2) Other participants. One factor which would have to be considered concerning an Asian-Western Pacific zone is whether Australia and New Zealand would have to be included. In defining the extent of this zone in the Pacific, one possibility might be to include all of the Pacific (with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand) south of the Equator and that portion of the Northern Pacific west of the International Date Line.

(3) Effects on U.S. From the standpoint of the United States, the creation of such a zone would mean, in effect, the withdrawal of United States nuclear weapons and missiles from territory under the jurisdiction and control of countries in the zone and, in order to reach agreement, from territory

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under United States jurisdiction and control as well.

The United States right to place in the area ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons would certainly be questioned even though such ships and aircraft were operated in international waters or airspace not subject to the jurisdiction or control of participating countries. Although such ships and aircraft could not be based in the zone, it would not, as a practical matter, be possible to exclude them. Under these circumstances, the United States might have to consider offering a "no first use" commitment with respect to nuclear weapons carried aboard United States ships and aircraft in the zone.

d. Europe. The question of the denuclearization of Europe is likely to be precipitated again by consideration of the establishment of denuclearized zones elsewhere. The United States would have to point out that the situation in Europe is obviously more complex than that existing in other regions and that the basic problem in Europe, which directly affects the United States and the Soviet Union, is that of removing existing instabilities through appropriate reductions

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of armaments and through related arms control arrangements. The United States desires to secure such arrangements but does not believe that the establishment of demuclearized zones in such areas as Latin America and Africa can, or need, await resolution of problems which exist between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

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